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THE FUTURE PROSPECTS
FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA*
It must by now be obvious to  every intelligence, I presume, 
luit the winds of change which have been sweeping across the 
continent of Africa over the last two decades, are presently also 
raging south of the Limpopo. Ever since Mr Harold Macmillan, 
the then prime minister of the United Kingdom, in his historic 
address of 3 February 1960 to  the South African parliam ent, 
directed our attention to  the political significance o f the prevail­
ing tide of national consciousness of the African peoples, the 
while man in Africa has felt the increasing chill o f the side- 
elïects of those winds so accurately predicted by him. Not only 
have we seen our western allies turning their backs on the White 
regime of South Africa, but on the domestic scene we have also 
experienced the murmurs of the African breeze and the unrest 
and even violence which signified an im patient urge on the part 
of the less privileged sections of the South African population for 
a better deal in what is their fatherland too.
At a time like this it is, I believe, m ost appropriate to  reflect 
on the future of our country and, perhaps, to  recall once again 
the prophetic enquiry of Dr D.F. Malan at the opening of the 
Voortrekker M onument on 16 December 1949: South Africa, 
quo vadis! In doing so we must realise that South Africa has been 
forced into a situation where we will have to  find our'solutions 
and work out our destiny in almost complete seclusion.
Even though circumstances compel us to  seek the answer to 
our problems on our own, we cannot isolate South Africa from 
the international com m unity o f states; and in whatever direction 
we may plan our future, we simply will have to give account of
* Address delivered at the Conference of the South African Council of Churches, Ham- 
manskraal, July 1977.
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our political institutions in terms o f internationally acceptable 
standards. The attention of the entire world has been focussed 
upon the future development of our political structure; and how ­
ever much the South African government may wish and 
endeavour to confine the impact of our political make-up i<> the 
enclave of our proper regional household, its effect upon even 
strictly internal race relations can no longer be said to be essen­
tially domestic.
Since the Second World War (1939-45) the idea of fundam ent­
al human rights has evolved as the criterion for the evaluation ol 
the political systems of our time; and whatever political structure 
we may elect for South Africa will be judged by the international 
com m unity of states with reference to the com patibility of that 
structure with the contem porary notion of human-rights ideals.
In this sense all reflections and deliberations on the political 
destiny of South Africa must begin with an enquiry into the fu­
ture prospects for the protection of hum an rights in our sub­
continent.
The international standard of hum an rights protection
What, then, are the standards by which South African political 
institutions are to  be judged?
As far as the United Nations Organization is concerned, the 
criterion to be applied finds expression in the UN Charter and in 
various international declarations and conventions for the pro­
m otion and enforcem ent of certain basic hum an rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In international law it is generally accept­
ed that any meaningful protection of hum an rights presupposes
(a) realization of the right to  self-determ ination of peoples, 
which includes the full and free participation of all adult citizens 
of a particular political com m unity in the legislative and govern­
mental instrum entalities of that com m unity; and
(b) adherence to  the principle of equality, which requires the 
equal treatm ent o f every individual w ithin a particular political
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com m unity by and before the law, and which only permits a clas­
sification of persons and differentiations between groups of per­
sons for purposes of the law in cases where a definite reasonable 
foundation for such classification and differentiations can be 
dem onstrated.
The recognition of the right to self-determination of peoples as 
a prerequisite for the meaningful protection of human rights 
originated from article 1(2) of the UN Charter, which proclaims 
the development of friendly relations among nations, “based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples” , to be a purpose of the organization — other provisions 
of the Charter referring to this right being articles 55 and 76. A 
long sequence of United Nations resolutions has endorsed the 
special importance attached by the international com m unity to 
the principle of political independence. In its resolution 421D(V) 
1950 the General Assembly of the United Nations decided that 
the right of peoples and nations to self-determination was a fun­
damental human right; and in resolution 637 (VII) 1952 the Ge­
neral Assembly went even further and actually acknowledged the 
right of peoples and nations to self-determination as a precondi­
tion for the full enjoym ent of all hum an rights. The right to  self­
determ ination also finds expression in the Declaration on the 
Granting o f  Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
1960, and in article 1 of the International Covenant on Econo­
mic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, and of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
The principle of equality is equally fundam ental to interna­
tional law as expounded by the United Nations. In article 1(3) of 
the UN Charter the purposes of the organization are said to in­
clude the achievement of international co-operation “ in pro­
m oting and encouraging respect for human rights and for funda­
mental freedoms for all w ithout distinction as to race, sex, lang­
uage, or religion” ; in article 13(1 )(b) of the Charter m ention is 
made of the task of the General Assembly to “ initiate studies and 
make recom mendations for the purpose of... assisting in the reali­
zation of human rights and fundam ental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” ; in article 55(c)
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of the Charter the United Nations is directed to “ prom ole... 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and luruh-i- 
mental freedoms for all w ithout distinction as to race, sex, lang­
uage or religion” , and by virtue of article 56 of the Charter all 
members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to lake 
jo in t and separate action in co-operation with the organization 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55; etc. In 
terms of article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, and article 2.1 of the Interna­
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, every State 
party to the respective covenants undertakes to ensure to all indi­
viduals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights enunciated in the covenants w ithout any discrimination 
based on “ race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other sta­
tus” , etc.
The particular rights and freedoms that ought to be 
safeguarded against state interference may, according to contem ­
porary notions, differ from time to time and from place to place 
in view of what Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949) called die Natur 
der Sache1); that is, the natural, social and juridical circum ­
stances under which the particular hum an rights arc destined to 
operate^). The international com m unity has nevertheless insisted 
on the docum entation of the rights and freedoms which are 
thought to be fundam ental.
The fact is that when the United Nations was brought into 
being in 1945 its founders considered the possibility of including 
a Bill of Rights in its Charter. The idea was abandoned for the 
time being because it was believed that diversities of opinion re­
garding the proper contents of an international Bill of Rights 
with binding force would prolong the inauguration of the world 
body. A commission was nevertheless immediately set up with in-
1) Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie 2c Aufl (Gottingen 1959) 20-3.
2) Idem  21.
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structions to draft a human rights charter, and in 1948 the com ­
mission came up with the Universal Declaration o f  Human 
Rights. Although the directions contained in the Declaration 
have no binding effect on the members of the United Nations, 
they do give an indication of the hum an rights standards insisted 
upon by world opinion.
The United Nations subsequently continued with its efforts to 
create an international Bill of Rights which would lend binding 
force to the principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. In fact it took the United Nations eighteen more 
years to produce such a human rights charter and ten further 
years to obtain the prescribed num ber of signatories in order to 
put that charter into operation. The final outcom e of it all was 
the International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 1966, and the International Covenant on Civil and Poli­
tical Rights, 1966, which came into force on 4 January  1976 and 
23 March 1976 (respectively).
The rights and freedoms listed in the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights include the right to work, the right to 
form and join trade unions, the right to social security, the right 
to  an adequate standard of living, the right to enjoy the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to 
education, the right to participate in cultural activities and to en­
joy the benefits of scientific progress, etc. The Covenant on Ci­
vil and Political Rights proclaims the right to  life, the right to li­
berty and security of the person, freedom of movement and the 
right to choose one’s residence, the right to privacy, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, the right to assemble peace­
fully, freedom of association, the right to vote and to participate 
in public affairs, etc., and it also provides for guarantees against 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatm ent and punishm ent, against 
slavery and involuntary servitude, against civil imprisonm ent, 
against arbitrary expulsion from a foreign country, etc.
Whereas, in international law, human rights have accordingly 
come to be sub-divided into economic, social and cultural rights 
on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other hand, 
a long standing tradition in the United States has been to dis­
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tinguish between substantive and procedural human rights, 
the former including basic human rights such as the freedom of 
speech and o f the press, the freedom of religion and the right to 
petition the government for the redress o f grievances, while the 
latter refer to basic principles of criminal and civil procedure, 
such as the guarantee of a fair trial by an independent tribunal, 
the right to legal representation, the right to state one’s case be­
fore being convicted, the proscription of double jeopardy in 
criminal prosecutions and guarantees against cruel and inhuman 
punishments.
In the present context mention may also be made of the com ­
mendable classification of human rights in the legal philosophy 
of Jacques Maritain (1882-1973). He distinguished three catego­
ries o f human rights:^) i.e. the rights o f  man as such, which in- 
include the right to personal freedom, the right to seek eternal 
life, the right to marry the person of one’s own choice and to  
raise a family, etc.; the rights o f  man as a citizen, which include 
the right to participate in political processes, to found and be ac­
tive in political associations, freedom of speech, etc.; and the 
rights o f  man as a social personality and in particular as a worker, 
which include the right freely to choose one’s occupation, the 
right to found and to participate in the activities o f professional 
and labour organizations, the right to equitable remuneration for 
one’s services, etc..
The doctrine of human rights has many pitfalls and every theo­
ry based upon its basic assumptions is perhaps open to destruc­
tive criticism. Yet the basic idea it endeavours to convey is a 
commendable one and does deserve to be implemented in the po- 
lititcal and legal systems of the entire world. In view o f a Christ­
ian interpretation of the theories of human rights the founda­
tional principle can perhaps be reduced to a sacred concern for 
the intrinsic value of human life and an unconditional insistence 
upon the appraisal of every human being according to his/her in-
3) Cf. Let Droits de IWomme et la Loi NaturtUe (Paris 1945) 110-13.
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dividual merit.
I wish to emphasise in passing that recourse to violence and 
bloodshed as a means for achieving or preserving protection of 
human lights clearly contradicts the very core of human-rights 
ideals as set out above. The truth is, however, that the founders 
of the United Nations have actually sanctioned armed interven­
tion as a last resort for purposes of suppressing a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression;^) apd the 
General Assembly of the United Nations has also recognised the 
use of armed force as a legitimate means for the liberation of 
peoples subjected to colonial or alien dom ination or to racist 
regimes^). The so-called freedom fighters of Africa may in fact 
also derive encouragement for their belligerent attem pts to  gain 
political control of Rhodesia, South West Africa/Namibia and 
South Africa from certain United Nations instrum ents, such as 
the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment o f  the Crime 
o f  Apartheid, 1973®), and from the many United Nations reso­
lutions condemning the White regimes in Southern Africa, the 
latest of which proclaimed the South African government to be 
“ illegitimate” and stated that the “ racist regime” in South Afri­
ca had left “no alternative to the oppressed people of South Afri­
ca but to  resort to armed struggle to  achieve their legitimate 
rights” ^).
I do not entertain the slightest doubt that the use of armed 
force as a means for achieving political purposes runs contrary to 
the basic values championed by Christian exponents of human- 
rights ideals; and in so far as the United Nations has attem pted to 
justify  belligerency in the relevant instances, its actions have, 
from a human rights point of view, been counter-productive. The
4) Cf. art. 42 of the UN Charter.
5) Cf. GA Res. 3103 (XXViii) 1973.
6) Cf. GA Res. 3068 (XXVIII) 1973. This convention came into force in November 
1976.
7) GA Res. 31/6 I (XXXI) 1976.
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instances in which political leaders, who have taken refuge in 
violence for political purposes, have been inspired by a genuine 
concern for human rights and fundam ental freedoms are at the 
most few and far between. Too often have the so-called freedom 
fighters directed their aggression against innocent people and t^o 
often have they resorted to  brutal cruelty. Warfare in whatever 
form ought always to remain restricted to  attacks upon the mili­
tary pqwers and strategic materials and installations of (lie ene­
m y; and under no pretences whatsoever can anything short of 
that be classified otherwise than as criminal terrorism and dow n­
right m urder.
Nor can the end justify the means. The moral value of ends 
invariably seems to be debatable, whereas the means that are re­
lied upon to sanctify the ends are always unquestionably base. 
Endeavours to justify  the use of adm ittedly rejectable means lor 
the sake of highly debatable ends therefore labour under an al­
most insurm ountable handicap. The celebrated American 
Supreme Court Judge, Louis D. Brandeis (1856-1941), expressed 
these same sentiments in the following terms: “One can never be 
sure of ends, political, social, economic. There there must always 
be doubt and difference o f opinion. There is not the same margin 
o f doubts as to means. Here fundamentals do not change; 
centuries o f thought have established standards. Lying and sneak­
ing are always bad, no m atter what the ends”^).
In view of these remarks I wish to add my own protestations 
to  those o f the many responsible South Africans of all races 
against material assistance and moral encouragement being given 
to violence com m itted by the so:called freedom movements in 
Africa by, inter alia, the United Nations and certain religious in­
stitutions, including the World Council of Churches. Even 
assuming (w ithout admitting) that liberation warfare can be re­
conciled with human rights principles and that the circumstances 
in Southern Africa are of a kind that would justify  such bellige­
rency, it still remains obvious that the recipients of the material
8) Quoted in A. Mason’s Brandeis: A Free Man's Life 569.
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and moral support in question are indulging in activities which in­
clude, by definition, acts of terrorism.
The human rights situation in South Africa
When one evaluates the political and legal system of South 
Africa in view of the basic prerequisites for, and norms inherent 
in, the meaningful protection of human rights, it becomes quite 
obvious that our institutions do not entirely make the grade. It is 
in fact a m atter of common knowledge that drastic reform will 
be needed to bring our political and legal system into conform ity 
with the appropriate international standards. A few examples of 
de facto  human rights infringements will suffice to  illustrate the 
point.
Political self-determination of peoples and the full and free 
participation of all the adult citizens of a given political com ­
m unity in the political processes of that com m unity has been 
identified as an im portant precondition for any meaningful pro­
tection of human rights. This idea is based upon the notion that 
the persons to be subjected to any particular legal provision must 
themselves, directly or indirectly, participate in the law-making 
and law-executing machinery; they m ust have a say in the m atter 
irrespective of whether the provisions in question serve to grant 
or to restrict their freedom. Contrary to these assumptions, poli­
tical competencies with regard to the major legislative and execu­
tive organs of South Africa are the prerogative of White citizens 
of the country^).
The second im portant prerequisite for meaningful human 
rights protection concerns the principle of justice. The very no­
tion of human rights presupposes that the rights and freedoms in-
9) Franchise rights in respect of parliamentary and provincial elections have been re­
stricted to the White electorate by virtue of sec. 3(1), read with the definition of 
“election” in sec. 1, of the Electoral Consolidation Act 46 of 1946. In terms of the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961 membership of the Senate 
(sec. 34(d)), the House of Assembly (sec. 46(c)) and Provincial Councils (sec. 68(2)) 
is equally the prerogative of Whites.
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sisted upon by the international com m unity should be enjoyed 
on a basis of equality by all the subjects of a given political com ­
m unity. Classifications of persons for juridical purposes are there­
fore immediately suspect and ought only to be perm itted in cases 
where such classifications are based upon a reasonable founda­
t io n ^ ) .  South African law contradicts this principle in the many 
instances of legally sanctioned discrimination based on sex, poli­
tical opinion, religious conviction, race and other similar factors.
Such instances of discrim ination authorised by South African 
law include the following: In terms of sec. 14(7) of the Public 
Service Act 54 of 1957 a female civil servant, no t being a 
m em ber of the South African Defence Force, the South African 
Police Force, the Prison Service or the Bureau of State Security, 
loses her job  when she marries, unless the M inister or Adm inistra­
to r of the governmental departm ent or province concerned, upon 
the recom m endation o f the Public Service Commission, directs 
otherwise — the civil service entertains no such bias against m ar­
ried males in its employ. By virtue of sec. 2(1) of the Internal 
Security Act 44 of 1950 the Communist Party of South Africa 
has been proclaim ed an unlawful organization and it is therefore, 
in terms o f sec. 3(1 )(a) o f the Act, an offence for any person 
(inter alia) to become, to continue to be, or to  perform  any act 
as, an office-bearer, officer or member of the Communist Party, 
or to contribute or solicit anything which can in any way be used 
for the benefit of the Communist Party, or to take part in or to 
continue any activity of the Com m unist Party, etc. — no such im­
pedim ents have been proclaim ed in the case o f any o ther o f the 
existing political parties; White children attending public schools 
in South Africa are, by virtue of sec. 2 of the National Education 
Policy Act 39 of 1967, compelled to undergo Christian National
1 0) The differentiation sanctioned by South African law in connection with the age of 
puberty for purposes of the competency to marry may be quoted as an example of a 
permissible classification, since it is based on the physiological fact that, in normal 
cases, the processes of sexual maturity commence, in the case of girls, at the age of 12 
years and, in the case of boys, at the age of 14 years; and since sexual maturity is rele­
vant to marriage, the fact that the competency to  marry is based on the age o f puberty 
cannot be said to be unjust.
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education — parents who wish to  base the education of theiT 
children upon a non-Christian religion m ust resort to  (unsubsi­
dized) private schools; in terms of sec. 3 of the Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953 separate facilities for 
different racial groups in or upon any public premises or public 
vehicle need not be equal — facilities in or upon public premises 
or public vehicles may in fact be provided for the members of 
one racial group w ithout similar facilities having to  be provided 
for any other racial group at all; etc.
As far as the protection of particular hum an rights is con­
c e rn e d ^ ) , South African law is again far from perfect, though, 
on the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that South 
African law does not render protection to basic human rights and 
fundam ental freedoms at all. We can, on the contrary, justifiably 
take pride in the measure of protection afforded by South Afri­
can law to substantive human rights such as family, educational 
arid trade union rights, and be proud o f the prevailing extent in 
South Africa of basic freedoms such as the freedom of speech 
and of the press and the freedom of conscience and of religion; 
and as far as procedural human rights are concerned, the most 
basic principles included in that concept can, generally speaking, 
also be said to be part and parcel of the South African system 
of evidence and procedure.
The shortcomings of the South African system of human- 
rights protections are not so much to  be found in the nature of 
the rights and freedoms being protected (or not being protected) 
or in the extent of such protection, bu t can be reduced to two 
fundamentally rejectable characteristics of our legal set-up: first­
ly, the fact that human rights protection has been sanctioned and 
is being administered on a racial discriminatory basis; and second­
ly, the fact that the de facto  protection of human rights has re-
11) An analysis of some of the laws of South Africa in terms of the doctrine of human 
rights is to be found in J.D . van der Vyver, Die Beskerming van Menseregte in Suid- 
Afrika (Juta & Co., Cape Town/Wynberg/Johannesburg/Durban 1975) and Seven Lec­
tures on Human Rights tJuta & Co., Cape Town/Wynberg/Johannesburg 1976).
483
mained dependent upon the highly unpredictable whims and 
fancies of the government of the day. What is needed in South 
Africa is, in the first place, a colour-blind adherence to the basic 
principles and values favoured by the hum an rights ideal; and, in 
the second place, the entrenchm ent of those principles and values 
in a constitutional instrum ent with inherent safeguards which 
will secure the continued protection of the concerned rights and 
freedoms by restricting their amendment or repeal to special cir­
cumstances and extraordinary procedures. We are, in a word, in 
want of a Bill of Rights which will afford entrenched protection 
to basic hum an rights and fundam ental freedoms on the basis of 
equality and justice.
South Africa, quo vadis!
The urgent need for change in South Africa has become 
axiomatic and seems to be generally recognized by every respon­
sible political leader in this country. One may in fact rightly 
speak of an awakening awareness amongst an increasing number 
o f South African academics and politicians — and in a cross­
section o f the population as a whole — regarding the true value 
and necessity of a more consistent, elaborate and visible system 
of human rights protection. Yet this mood for change is in itself 
in need of dynamic stimulation. For it finds itself confronted by 
various resistant factors which may in the end hamper the de 
facto  im plem entation of actual reform. I shall m ention only a 
few of the most obvious obstructions in the way of the neces­
sary political and legal innovations:
(a) Firstly the economic prosperity of the country. The 
present government came into power in 1948 and has since then 
led this country to probably the biggest economic boom in the 
history of our ancestry. Until fairly recently White South Afri­
cans — the people upon whose support the government is depen­
dent for bringing about reform — have reaped the fruits of that 
boom.
History has proved that all nations are reluctant to initiate 
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radical change while, in the area of economics, the going is good. 
Reform breeds upon hardship rather than prosperity. There is no 
reason to believe that the sentiments in this regard entertained by 
the White electorate of South Africa constitute an exception to 
the rule; and although the economic boom has obviously come to 
an end, the people whose votes really count at the polls have not 
yet felt the sting of the present recession to  an ex ten t where 
insistence upon adaptations of our social structure to the needs 
of the day becomes a dominant factor in the democratic proces­
ses.
(b) The second im portant factor which has created resistance 
to change in South Africa may perhaps be referred to as the ex­
pediency of the propaganda machinery of the National Party. 
Party spokesmen have over a period of more than twenty years 
brainwashed a majority of the voters into believing that the poli­
cies advocated by the Party, and in particular the idea of apart­
heid and separate development, provide an adequate answer to 
South Africa’s problems and that the total im plem entation of 
those policies would constitute the ultimate utopia in hum an re­
lations.
Since more or less the last turn of the decade the tru th  has 
dawned upon many Party office-bearers that apartheid and se­
parate development may just no t be a practicable means for 
achieving racial harmony and for securing the peaceful co­
existence of all the racial groups of South Africa in our sub­
continent. That, after all, is what it is all about. Talks of change 
and reform therefore became the order of the day, even within 
the ranks of the Party leadership. But then it turned out that a 
substantial percentage of Party supporters were simply not ready 
to accept that they had actually been misled in the past. Now the 
Party finds that its efforts to initiate reform along alternative 
lines meet with internal opposition; and while the time for 
achieving a peaceful solution to South Africa’s problems is run­
ning out, energies must be spent on combating the successes of 
the Party’s own propaganda efforts of the past in order to change 
the attitudes and recapture the minds of the obstructionists 
among the Party’s own members.
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It stands to reason that one m ust no t expect too much in the 
line of meaningful reform as long as the government is faced with 
internal opposition o f the nature described above. To go against 
o r too far beyond the wishes of its own supporters could mean 
political suicide; and that is too much to expect of any political 
party.
(c) A third obstacle in the way of meaningful change is, in my 
opinion, attributable to a fairly general m isconception in South 
Africa as to  the true impulse behind the need for reform. Too 
many persons on both sides of the colour bar entertain the nega­
tive notion that change and reform represent concessions of the 
White man to the growing tide of Black national consciousness. 
This approach m ust in itself create reluctance on the part of the 
people who are believed to have been forced into a situation of 
retreat; and those people happen to be the ones who monopolise 
the political recourses for the accomplishment of changes and re­
forms along constitutional and peaceful lines.
The tru th  is that remoulding of the South African political and 
legal structure is called for as a m atter of Christian necessity. We 
ought to have it on our conscience to find a form ula for human 
relations which shall reflect the respect for the dignity and worth 
of his fellow-man required of man on the basis of the eternal 
comm and which directs man to love his neighbour. Only such a 
social system can, internationally speaking, bear the light of day 
and, at the same time, find satisfaction in the eyes of God.
The Whites of South Africa m ust accordingly be persuaded 
that by initiating change they are not in fact backing away from 
principles which they may happen to  cherish, but that, on the 
contrary, social reform is being demanded by the very religious, 
ethical, cultural, economic and other values which they seek to 
uphold.
(d) Finally, one may in the present context refer to what can 
conveniently be called the Soweto backlash.
Whatever sympathies one may have with the participants in 
the Soweto riots, and similar disturbances, however much one 
may concede the validity of the grievances that gave rise to the
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unrest, the fact remains that, in so far as the prospects for peace­
ful change in South Africa are concerned, violence of that nature 
was, to say the least, counter-productive. It is a m atter of trite 
history that the tedious process of gradual reform which had 
been noticeable in the area of, for instance, sport, public facili­
ties and labour relations came to an almost complete stop when 
the riots erupted; and although efforts on the part of the govern­
ment to normalise race relations in South Africa seem once again 
to have gained m om entum , the pace of those efforts has obvious­
ly slowed down considerably. The Whites in Africa — and the 
Afrikaners probably more so than any others — have consistently 
proved that they become exceptionally stubborn when 
threatened with violent means of compulsion.
What then does the future hold out for South Africa?
In attem pting to give an answer to this question, I shall restrict 
myself to what I believe to be the realities of tomorrow: not 
what in my opinion ought to be our aims, bu t what I expect will 
in fact be accomplished in the immediate future as far as human 
rights protection is concerned. It must be emphasised that pro­
phecies of this nature are bound to be inaccurate, for as time 
goes on it seems to accelerate beyond the limits of human com ­
prehension and tends to belie even our most evident expecta­
tions. One can but evaluate the present tendencies, regard the 
continuity of historical patterns and, in the end, take a long shot 
in the dark.
In view of the above analysis of the human rights idea, I shall 
deal with the probabilities of the immediate future under three 
headings: (a) the doctrine of national self-determination and poli­
tical participation; (b) the principle of equality; and (c) the 
extension of hum an rights protection — and I shall assume that 
the National Party will in the foreseeable future retain political 
control of South Africa.
1. National self-determination and political participation
South Africa’s present political predicam ent can perhaps best
487
be understood against the background of the conflicting national 
aspirations of the various peoples who inhabit our sub-continent. 
I t  is, in a word, a problem  of racial, ethnic and cultural pluralism.
An overwhelming m ajority o f White South Africans have in 
the past sought to  deal with the strife and conflicts, which always 
seem to be an integral risk in pluralistic societies, on the basis of 
geographical partition . As far as the Afrikaners are concerned, in­
sistence on separation o f the races was, in a way, an inevitable 
consequence o f their political evolution. The history of South 
Africa in fact reflects the continued struggle of the Afrikaner to  
found a settlem ent on the continent o f Africa where he would be 
free from foreign dom ination; and having achieved political con­
trol o f South Africa in 1924 and again in 1948, the National 
Party, as the citadel of Afrikaner national aspirations, proved it­
self prepared to  secure the newly acquired right to  self-determi­
nation of the Afrikaner people at almost any cost. In the present 
context it m ust once again be stressed that the right to  self­
determ ination constitutes a noble cause in the eyes o f the United 
Nations and the international com m unity of states.
South Africa being a plural society with com plicated racial, 
ethnic and cultural entanglem ents, the White regime was, how ­
ever, unable to monopolise political power w ithout resorting to 
political dom ination of the o ther races of South Africa. This 
presented a serious problem , because imperialism was never part 
o f the Afrikaner’s national make-up. The Tomlinson Commission 
was therefore appointed to  find a form ula whereby the Whites in 
South Africa could exercise their right of political self-determi­
nation while a t the same time perm itting the o ther ethnic entities 
w ithin the country to  do the same. The Tomlinson Commission 
drafted  in its report o f 1955 the blueprint for the separate de­
velopm ent of the peoples o f South Africa and at the same tim e 
spelt ou t the immense financial and o ther sacrifices that would 
be required of the White man if the policy were to  succeed.
I need not dwell upon the subsequent history of the policy of 
separate developm ent, save perhaps in m entioning that the Na­
tional Party government never really gave it a chance to  work.
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Not having wanted to  burden the White electorate to  any 
perceptible extent, the government right from the outset rejected 
some of the most fundamental demands of the Tomlinson Com­
mission and indulged in a luke-warm im plem entation of the 
policy of separate development, thereby frustrating the very pur­
pose of that policy, that is, to secure the right to  self-determina­
tion of all the peoples of South Africa on a territorial basis. As it 
stands today, the territorial entities envisaged by the government 
for the Black peoples of South Africa are, for the m ost part, not 
sufficiently viable to  make political sense, and the policy simply 
makes no provision whatsoever for the Indian, coloured and u r­
banised Black communities. We have, therefore, now come to 
the point where an alternative or supplementary plan of action 
m ust be sought to safeguard the peaceful co-existence of the peo­
ples of South Africa in a system of full participation of all of 
those peoples in the various political processes of the state.
Any prognosis of the future development of South African 
political institutions must allow for certain elementary premises. 
The most evident ones are, perhaps, the following:
(a) Although the right to self-determination of peoples ought 
always to maintain a supreme rating on the scale of political va­
lues, its realization is not immune to moral scrutiny and should 
under no circumstances be achieved or preserved in a m anner 
which would perpetuate injustices. Irrespective of the ethical is­
sues that may be involved, history has provided ample proof that 
a nation simply cannot in the long run retain its political inde­
pendence at the expense of its own people or of any other 
nation.
(b) All arrangements for the future political structure of South 
Africa m ust take the plural composition of its population into 
account. Ethnic or cultural plurality is a world-wide reality with 
definite political significance.
A recent s u r v e y ^ )  disclosed in this regard the following il-
12) Abdul Said & Luiz R. Simmons, Ethnicity in an International Context (Transac­
tion Books, New Brunswick, NJ> 1976).
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luminating statistics: In the 132 states o f the world included in 
the survey —
(i) 12 (9,1 percent), of which only one was an African state (i.e. 
Somalia), were found to  house a single ethnic group;
(ii) 25 (18,9 percent) had a dom inant ethnic group of 90 percent 
or m ore of the population;
(iii) 25 (18,9 percent) had a dom inant ethnic group o f between 
75 and 89 percent of the population;
(iv) in 31 (23,5 percent) the largest ethnic group consisted of be­
tween 50 percent and 74 percent of the population;
(v) in 39 (29,5 percent) the largest ethnic group accounted for 
less than 50 percent of the population.
It was furtherm ore estim ated that in 53 states the population 
was composed of five or m ore significant ethnic groups; and of 
these South Africa was found to be the m ost complex.
The pattern  of constitutional crises in Africa is, in my opinion, 
to a great extent attributable to sectional strife or cultural chau­
vinism in plural societies and should in that sense be seen as a 
clear indication of the political relevance o f ethnicity.
The imperialists of bygone days, such as England and France, 
can justly pride themselves on having started their form er colo­
nies in Africa on the route of independence equipped with truly 
democratic and libertarian systems of government. But very little 
of the dual-party system, free elections, freedom of the press, the 
right to  speak one’s mind and o ther foundational values of a free 
society has remained in force in the third-world countries. The 
overthrowing of governments has almost become a regular ingre­
dient of the African way of living, and the many instances in re­
cent years of coups d ’états inspired by tribal expedience run well 
into double f ig u res^ ). The m ajor cause of the political
13) Successful coups d'états have taken place in the following African countries: Alge­
ria — on 19 June 1965; Benin (formerly Dahomey) — altogether six, the last one in. 
1972; Brazzaville-Congo — various ones, the last one in 1969; Burundi — on 11 July 
1966; Gabon -  in 1964; Ghana — on 13 January 1972; Libya — in 1969; Nigeria — in 
1 976; Seychelles — in 1977; Somalia — in October 1969; Sudan — in November 1958 
and in 1964; Togo — three within four years, the last one in 1967; Uganda — in 1971; 
Zaire — in 1960.
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confusion in Africa is, in my opinion, the failure of the former 
colonial powers to  recognise the fact of, or the political force 
engendered by, ethnicity.
According to current interpretations of hum an rights ideals, 
ethnicity ought not to be a determining factor as far as political 
competencies are concerned; or to pu t it more bluntly, differen­
tiations for political purposes based upon race, cultural affilia­
tions or ethnic origin are generally regarded as essentially base. 
The tru th  is, however, that ethnicity is a fact in Africa with very 
definite political connotations. To ignore that fact would be un­
realistic and may result in the kind of confusion exemplified by 
the African political experience; to  give ethnicity its due in our 
future political dispensation may, on the other hand, tend to 
perpetuate the sectional strife of ethnistic egotism. In my opi­
nion we ought to risk the latter for the sake of a realistic ap­
proach.
(c) A third axiomatic proposition which needs emphasis is 
that majority rule on the basis of one man one vote in a single 
state comprising an ethnic diversity is definitely out.
Insofar as the policy of the present government is directed to ­
wards creating more or less homogenous national states and in­
sofar as it provides for certain of the peoples of South Africa, 
who wish to do so, to achieve full political control o f their own 
affairs, its im plem entation on a reasonable and just basis ought to  
be encouraged by all who value the right o f peoples to  political 
self-determination — which, as you may recall, includes the 
United Nations and the international com m unity o f states. But in 
whatever way one looks at it, the fact remains that a substantial 
portion  o f the present-day South Africa will in the end remain 
multi-national. Even assuming that all o f the Black homelands 
will eventually be consolidated into viable entities and will re­
quest and be granted independence, one must still cope with 
ethnic plurality in the remainder of South Africa being occupied 
by the White population together with Coloureds, Indians and 
urbanised Blacks. For the purposes o f this, shall we say, “grey” 
portion of South Africa, majority rule on the basis o f one man
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one vote simply is no t practical politics.
Nor does the system of m ajority rule, in my opinion, coincide 
with the basic assumptions of the doctrine of hum an rights. Poli­
tical control o f a m inority by the m ajority has all the potential of 
leading to  more ghastly consequences than would be the case 
where a m inority dom inates the m ajority, for in the latter in­
stance the greater numbers of the subjected group tend to  re­
strain the exercise of arbitrary powers. Furtherm ore, the politi­
cal history of Africa — not forgetting our own constitutional 
scandal o f the 1950’s which culm inated in the Senate Act 53 of 
1955 — has provided ample p roof that constitutional guarantees 
of the rights and freedoms of subjects belonging to  subordinate 
ethnic entities are, to  say the least, dubious.
What is required, therefore, is an alternative system of full par­
ticipation; that is a system in which every ethnic entity  shall 
maintain an effective say in all legislative, governmental and jud i­
cial processes. Such a system m ay require the com position of the 
cabinet, as head of the executive branch o f governm ent, on an 
ethnic basis so that every ethnic group within the state will at all 
times necessarily be represented in the policy-making organ of 
the state. Representation of all ethnic groups in the legislative 
assembly can perhaps be effected by free elections based on a 
separate voters’ roll, and the de facto  control of any particular 
legislation by an ethnic group being affected by that legislation, 
can be secured by means of a right of veto. The courts, as the fi­
nal custodian of hum an rights protection, ought at all times to be 
staffed in strict observance of individual m erit, provided, how ­
ever, that opportunities shall remain open for members of all 
ethnic groups to acquire the training and experience required for 
their appointm ent as judicial officers of every rank.
(d) Finally, I wish to  emphasise the evident need for all e th ­
nic groups involved to  participate in the final draft o f our 
com m on political future; for politics has become exceptionally 
hostile towards all expressions of paternalism.
It is equally beyond dispute that South Africa does possess the 
brainpower to m ould the above principles into a workable system
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of inter-group cooperation. The success of such endeavours will, 
however, in the end depend upon the ability of the political 
leaders to combine the wisdom of our constitutional intelligent­
sia with m utual trust, goodwill, integrity and determ ination. This 
will undoubtedly be difficult to achieve, b u t is by no means im­
possible. The sceptics in our midst may be reminded of the lesson 
in trans-ethnic co-operation so dramatically dem onstrated by the 
Turnhalle experiment.
Turning next to the probable constitutional developments of 
the immediate future I must at once caution those seeking com ­
fort in my lecture not to  expect too much. There are vague indi­
cations that the government is contem plating a new deal for the 
Coloured and Indian sections of the South African nation, bu t it 
has become quite clear that the members of the cabinet com m it­
tee entrusted with the task of finding an alternative for the West­
m inster system of government differ greatly as to  the proper 
means for accommodating the political aspirations of the Co­
loureds and Indians within the framework of the so-called 
“W hite” political order. It is therefore to be expected that their 
recom m endations will not am ount to much more than the 
lim ited extension of the powers of the Cabinet Council as a 
forum for selective dialogue. South Africans will, after all, soon 
be going to the polls and one can hardly expect the governm ent 
to confuse the National Party constituents on the eve of the 
election with the intricacies of a highly controversial issue. The 
not so immediate future nevertheless holds out promises of m ore 
spectacular reform on the lines of the basic principles m entioned 
above.
2. Equality and justice
The elimination of racial discrimination constitutes almost as 
big a challenge as the extension o f political rights to all the 
peoples of South Africa and is perhaps dependent on the actual­
ization of an acceptable system of political power-sharing. The 
urgent necessity of restoring justice in South Africa stands to
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reason and is generally accepted by a large cross-section of 
South Africans o f all racial groups. The South African govern­
m ent has in fact com m itted itself internationally to “ move away 
from racial discrim ination” , and the only remaining controversy 
in this regard seems to have become focussed on problem s re­
lating to the m ethod, sequence and speed of this imperative re­
form. It m ust however again be emphasised that petty  poli­
ticizing has had a crippling effect on the de facto  normalization 
o f race relations. Furtherm ore, certain instances of racial dis­
crim ination, such as the existing laws relating to  group areas and 
influx control, are essential accessories of the formative stages of 
separate developm ent, and their abolition will in all probability 
be postponed until the political entrepreneurs will have created 
sufficient safeguards for the free exercise of political rights by all 
ethnic groups. On the o ther hand, the government can do away 
with at least ninety percent o f legally sanctioned discrimination 
w ithout in any way jeopardising the im plem entation of its policy 
o f separate development.
All that remains to  be said in the present regard is to  call upon 
the government, as a m atter of great urgency, to do so w ithout 
further delay. One m ust no t be unm indful of, or ungrateful for, 
the changes that have been introduced by the government over 
the last few years; nor ought one to ignore or oversimplify the 
practical problems that m ust be overcome in the process of era­
dicating discrim inatory practices which have been cultivated by 
established traditions. I am, however, convinced that such p ro­
blems are not insurm ountable and that the principle of non­
discrim ination already has sufficient backing within the ranks of 
National Party supporters for the government really to get on 
with the job. The current signs of reluctance on the part o f some 
National Party spokesmen to increase the tem po of reform may, 
therefore, cast doubt upon the credibility of the many assurances 
given by the government that it would move away from racial 
discrim ination.
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3. Human rights protection
As pointed out earlier, deficiencies from a human rights point 
o f view of the South African legal system are not so much to be 
found in the nature or extent of the rights and freedoms being 
protected  or not, but stem from two basic characteristics of the 
South African laws in question: firstly, the racially based discri­
m inatory application o f hum an rights protection; and secondly, 
the lack of appropriate constitutional safeguards.
South Africa can, objectively speaking, go a long way to 
satisfy the international appetite for human rights protection, 
but as long as racial discrimination prevails in this country, the 
existing laws which afford protection to  basic hum an rights and 
fundam ental freedoms will be run down by South Africa’s cri­
tics as being “ cosm etic” . This will be so by virtue o f the general­
ly accepted premise that the sociological principle of non­
discrim ination, together with the political principle o f full parti­
cipation, is an essential prerequisite for any meaningful p ro­
tection o f hum an rights. In actual fact very little needs to  be 
done right now in the area of hum an rights protection as such. 
Priority must be afforded to  the solution of the political problem 
and to  the elimination of racial discrimination.
The South African system of hum an rights protection can 
nevertheless be improved by the introduction of a Bill of Rights 
which would barricade the protected rights and freedoms against 
discretionary and arbitrary governmental encroachments. Parti­
sans of this idea have in the past experienced strenuous opposi­
tion on the part of several government spokesmen, presumably 
on account of the mistaken belief that constitutional entrench­
m ent would result in the promulgation of absolute rights and 
competencies. This m isconception has probably been inspired by 
the tendency in the United States to transform the 
constitutionally protected hum an rights into infinite claims and 
titles. The tru th  is, however, that constitutional safeguards need 
not change the nature or ambit of the rights and freedoms con­
cerned. I believe, in fact, that the American notion of preferred
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freedoms is opposed to the postulate of justice which requires an 
equilibrium of all conflicting claims to be maintained in con­
formity with the Roman-Dutch maxim: sic utere tuo ut alienum  
non laedas (use what is yours so as no t to injure others). The en­
trenchm ent o f certain rights and freedoms in a Bill of Rights 
should not, therefore, entitle the subordinates of the state to 
claim excessive or extensive privileges arising from those rights 
and freedoms, at the cost of any other right, freedom or interest, 
whether included in the Bill of Rights or not. The only 
significance o f a Bill of Rights would be that the government is 
constantly reminded that the rights and freedoms it contains 
have been regarded as of special importance for the preservation 
of a free society, that those rights and freedoms can be curtailed 
by state authority  in the specified circumstances and to the speci­
fied extent only, and that restrictions upon those rights and free­
doms ought always to rejnain the exception and not the rule.
Though -a Bill of Rights for South Africa is, to the best of my 
knowledge, no t anticipated by the present government at all, 
explication of the nature, function and implications of such a 
constitutional deed may just bring the idea home to the right 
authorities.
Concluding remarks
• ' I
The prospects for the future may to some seem grim, but 
while the scope for dialogue remains, there will be hope. The first 
and major obstacle to overcome, is perhaps the comm unication 
gap between the government and the people, between the diffe­
rent races, and between sectional groups within each ethnic en­
tity . >
May this conference contribute towards the bridging of that 
gap!
* *
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Note
Readers are requested to direct com m ent, if any, on this view­
point to us for eventual discussion in a following English issue.
Editor.
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